LES ANNALES DES MINES
Responsabilité
& Environnement n° 65 January 2012
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The relevancy of
Yves Martin’s ideas The first part of this special issue groups accounts from persons who had professional contacts with Yves Martin and attended a colloquium held on 19 May 2011 at Mines ParisTech. In the second part, texts by Yves Martin have been arranged under five major headings, each introduced by a specialist. He
defended these principles when criticizing the legislation applied to
water
resources. According to him, it was not judicious to establish a
Malthusian set
of regulations that subjected catchment to obtaining prior
authorization and
considerably restricted access to water under ground. On the contrary,
he felt
that public interventions should rely on incentives for drawing
groundwater (at
least from most aquifers) rather than using surface water. For this
purpose, he
proposed combining financial incentives (geographically modulated in
significant ways depending on the aquifer) with regulations
about how to protect this resource and about the technical conditions
for
tapping it (the duty to measure the quantity). The job of providing
economic
incentives should be handed over to water agencies (operating on a
system of
privileges and royalties) whereas the actions of regulation and
prevention
should be the duty of services that police the water supply. Public
authorities
should use the most effective tools and know how to combine them:
regulation
through water royalties, financial incentives and, if need be, penal
sanctions. Yves Martin called for heavily adjusting water royalties so as to send an economic signal to users. To work as an incentive, royalties should be set high enough to affect stakeholders. Instead of being uniform, rates should take into account the costs of the measures users have to adopt for the general interest. This entailed criticism of the French fiscal tradition with its preference for low rates and a broad tax base.
He
also had reservations about a system of tradeable permits for
greenhouse
gases, since it would be hard to control and subject to strong
speculation. Instead, he incessantly argued for a worldwide carbon tax.
Its
effectiveness would mainly depend on how progressive it would be and on
how
foreseeable the adjustment of its rates would be, with steady increases
to a
high level in the long run. Such a tax would send a signal about prices
and
motivate all parties to change behaviors related to both consumption
and
production. For Yves Martin, a carbon tax would allow for economic
development
since it makes it possible to: - formulate
a response to social issues. As a
counterpart to the consequent price hikes in fossil fuels, he advocated
lowering the TVA for certain products and reducing the Social Security
taxes
withheld on wages. In an article written with Michel Rocard, he pointed
out
that wages account for 38% of the Social Security budget as compared
with 3,5%
from fossil fuels. - improve
competitiveness, under condition that
the WTO adopt measures for compensating firms in the lands that promise
to
reduce emissions. - develop
materials or processes (for instance,
the timber industry) that emit less greenhouse gas. Yves Martin made two observations about the French forest: the harvest of wood has more or less stagnated in recent decades, and the average price of the wood harvested has been cut in three or even four over the last thirty years. Establishing a carbon tax on fossil fuels would lead to a new equilibrium in favor of wood by increasing both the consumption of this material and, concomitantly, its price. This would have a positive impact on the environment, since timber sustainably stocks CO2 like a well-managed forest. A carbon tax would thus be profitable to French forests while reducing the budget deficit (by scaling back expenditures for the fight against greenhouse gases) and lowering unemployment (by decreasing wage taxes). Energy policy
and controlling demand
Already
in 1974, he maintained that — given the necessarily diffuse,
complex
nature of actions for saving energy and given the commercial force of
those
who, producing and selling energy, are inclined to push consumption up
rather
than down — a public agency was needed that would be responsible for
“selling”
the idea of saving energy. Thus was created the
Agence pour les Économies d’Énergie (AEE), which, in
1982, became the Agence Française pour
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Yves
Martin always supported long-term measures with a foreseeable calendar
so that
stakeholders be forewarned and adapt their behaviors. He valued
structural policies that were not to be dictated by the business cycle
alone
(in particular by oil prices). For these long-term policies, he
emphasized the
need to act on behaviors and reduce needs instead of relying
exclusively on
scientific progress and reduced consumption. His steadfast ideas with regard to energy policy were characterized by a demanding precision and a remarkable capacity for anticipating the future.
Economic
instruments
Environmental
taxes should, in his opinion, be “heavy, not specifically attributed to
protecting the environment but also devoted to covering general public
expenditures”. These “ecotaxes” would be set at a “rate programmed to
gradually
increase over several years to allow for technological anticipations
and an
optimized choice of investments”. Their high rate would do much to
restrain
behaviors harmful to the environment. There was, he pointed out, a
difference
between these “genuine” green taxes and the taxes that were called
“ecological”
because the receipts were handed over to funds for protecting the
environment. Yves
Martin — one of the first persons to call for the creation of
water
agencies — thought the importance of this action lay less in the
subsidies
to be distributed by these agencies than in the royalties they would
take in.
These royalties were to send a signal that would make all stakeholders
realize
the value of the resource they were tapping and the cost of the
pollution they
were producing. Yves Martin’s approach to environmental taxes was
original in
many respects: - It
identified the structural problems that this
fiscal system should address (for example, the use of automobiles and
highway
transportation, or the value of forests). - These
fiscal measures were part of a global
program with agencies organized to manage it (the water agencies,
ADEME, the
interministerial mission on greenhouse gases). - This
fiscal reform had a macroecomic dimension
that would favor the development of a competitive economy and of social
justice
owing to lower wage taxes. - An
analysis was made of the potential deviant
effects of these fiscal measures, which might lead to economic
decisions that
were not optimal or that wasted public funds. These
thoughts about environmental taxes are valuable in the current context
as we
face the crucial issues of managing resources, fighting against global
warming,
improving the competitiveness of our economy, and balancing public
budgets.
He
also wanted all services responsible for nuclear safety to be grouped
together
in an independent agency under the Prime Minister. He thus foresaw the
Agence
de Sécurité Nucléaire (ASN), created under Act no 2006-686
of
13 June 2006 (the so-called “TSN law” on transparency and nuclear
security). |
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